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The Immigration and Nationality Act enumerates 18 deportable
classes,' ranging from aliens who were inadmissible at time of
entry or entered without inspection, to aliens who, after entry, were
convicted of certain crimes or who performed or failed to perform
certain acts. Of the 788,145 deportable aliens discovered in fiscal
year 1974 by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
693,084, or 87.9%, entered without inspection.2  The next largest
categories were 55,485 temporary visitors and 12,687 crewmen,3 most
of whom had remained beyond the period of their authorized stay
and some of whom had violated the terms of their temporary admis-
sion by engaging in unauthorized employment. Illegal aliens lo-
cated by INS may be permitted to depart voluntarily or may be
forced to depart under an order of deportation.4 By far the largest
* General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Service.
1. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1970).
See also Wasserman, Grounds and Procedures for Deportation, 13 SAN DiEGO
L. REv. 125 (1975).
2. 1974 INS ANN. REP. 94, table 27B.
3. Id.
4. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970).
number are allowed to leave voluntarily without deportation pro-
ceedings; they are chiefly Mexicans who entered without inspec-
tion. 5
The enforcement powers which enable INS to apprehend massive
numbers of illegal aliens are expressly spelled out by statute.6
Without a warrant, immigration officers are authorized to interro-
gate any person they believe to be an alien about his presence in
the United States and to arrest him if they have reason to believe
he is in the country unlawfully and likely to escape before a war-
rant can be obtained. When needed, warrants can be issued by
district directors and specified senior officials of INS to whom the
statutory authority of the Attorney General has been delegated.7
In addition, immigration officers are empowered, without a war-
rant, to search any vehicle within a reasonable distance from any
external boundary of the United States. The regulations define a
reasonable distance as 100 air miles.8 To prevent illegal entry, im-
migration officers also have access to private lands, but not dwell-
ings within 25 miles of any external boundary.9
Almeida-Sanchez AND THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES BY ROVING PATROLS
For about 50 years, patrol agents of INS in the southwest have
been stopping and searching vehicles near the border for illegal
aliens.10 In the course of such operations smugglers and narcotics
are frequently found. Until June 21, 1973, challenges to the legality
of vehicle searches for illegal aliens were unsuccessful. On that
day, the Supreme Court in Aimeida-Sanchez v. United States,"
in a five to four decision, held that warrantless, non-border searches
of vehicles by roving patrols without probable cause or consent vi-
5. In fiscal year 1974, voluntary departure under safeguards was au-
thorized for 657,169 aliens. Actual deportations pursuant to formal expul-
sion proceedings numbered 18,824. See 1974 INS ANN. REP. 85-86, tables
24 & 24A.
6. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970).
7. 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 242.2 (a) (1975).
8. Id.
9. Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(a) (3), 8 US.C. § 1357(a) (3)
(1970).
10. The border patrol of the INS was established by the Act of Feb. 27,
1925, ch. 364, 43 Stat. 1014, 1049-50. In 1946, it was represented to Con-
gress that the legal right to stop and search vehicles within a reasonable
distance from the borders should be conferred by law. The result was ex-
press statutory authority, Act of Aug. 7, 1946, ch. 768, 60 Stat. 865, which
was codified into the Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a) (1970).
11. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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olated the fourth amendment. Justice Powell's separate concurring
opinion was necessary to establish a majority.
Less than a year later the Ninth Circuit, which has jurisdiction
over the southwestern border states of California and Arizona, de-
cided en banc seven to six that the Almeida-Sanchez prohibition
against warrantless searches by roving patrols also applies to ve-
hicle searches for illegal aliens at highway checkpoints near the
border, but not retroactively.12 In that case, United States v.
Bowen, the Government had argued that there are constitutional
differences between roving patrols and fixed checkpoints.
First, since checkpoints generally involve a stop and inspection of
every car passing through they provide much less opportunity for
the unfettered discretion of the police officer that was condemned
in Almeida-Sanchez .... Second, being stopped on a lonely
road at night in a sparsely populated part of the country... is
more burdensome to the traveller than a stop at an identified and
lighted checkpoint. 13
The court stated that
•. . even conceding that a fixed checkpoint might be less of an
imposition on domestic travellers than a roving patrol search, we
are able to find nothing in the opinion of the court in Almeida-
Sanchez which suspends Fourth Amendment standards in dealing
with immigration searches at fixed checkpoints.14
In United States v. Hart,'5 the Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding
that the operational differences between roving patrols and perma-
nent checkpoints are substantial.
Hardly had the ink dried on Bowen when the Ninth Circuit ruled
that routine vehicle stops at a traffic checkpoint require a founded
suspicion that the vehicle may contain illegal aliens.' 6 This was
promptly followed by a Ninth Circuit holding that a roving patrol-
type stop violated fourth amendment standards because it was not
based on a founded suspicion.' 7 Two weeks later in a temporary
12. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974).
13. Id. at 964.
14. Id. On June 20, 1975, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding in
Bowen that Atmeida-Sanchez is not to be applied retroactively to check-
points, but stated that the Ninth Circuit's ruling that Almeida-Sanchez ap-
plied to checkpoints was unnecessary. Bowen v. United States, 95 S. Ct.
2569 (1975).
15. 506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1975).
16. United States v. Juarez-Rodriquez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974).
17. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974).
checkpoint case the court declared that vehicle stops for immigra-
tion interrogation near the border cannot be made without at least
a reasonable belief founded upon "articulable" facts that one or
more of the people to be interrogated are aliens illegally in the
country.1
8
Faced with the rapid succession of Ninth Circuit decisions outlaw-
ing warrantless, non-border stops of vehicles for immigration inter-
rogation and search, the Government reluctantly decided to adopt
the procedure expounded by Justice Powell in his concurring
opinion in Almeida-Sanchez. His answer to the problem was an
area warrant under which border patrol agents would obtain ad-
vance judicial approval to conduct roving searches on a particular
road or roads for a reasonable period of time. Justice White, writ-
ing for the four dissenters in Almeida-Sanchez, agreed with Justice
Powell that searches based on area warrants would satisfy the
fourth amendment. Justice White expected that such warrants, al-
though unnecessary, would be readily issued. A footnote to the
majority opinion stated that the justices who joined in it were di-
vided on the constitutionality of area warrants, indicating that at
least six justices regarded them as constitutional. 19
Notwithstanding the Government's contention in Bowen that rov-
ing patrol and checkpoint operations were constitutionally distin-
guishable, warrants were requested in order to continue the opera-
tion of all traffic checkpoints within the jurisdiction of the Ninth
Circuit. Initially, some warrants authorized routine inspection of
vehicles, but later limited the authority of patrol agents to stop
and inquire. The warrants recited that they were based on prob-
able cause to believe that mass immigration violations were oc-
curring at the checkpoints. They ran for ten day periods at the
end of which renewal requests were granted. A separate warrant
had to be obtained for each checkpoint. Some district judges re-
fused to issue warrants because they felt that probable cause stand-
ards had not been met. Nevertheless, under the warrant procedure,
border patrol agents were able to operate the checkpoints although
they found the procedure cumbersome.20
18. United States v. Esquer-Rivera, 500 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974).
19. 413 U.S. at 270 n.3.
20. Additional manpower had to be used to compile and maintain com-
plex statistics needed to make returns on the warrants and to support re-
newal applications. Frequently, checkpoints had to be closed down for
short periods because further data was demanded from patrol agents or a
judicial officer was not immediately available. The only alternative to the
warrant procedure was to discontinue checkpoint operations in areas known
to be saturated with illegal aliens who were using the highways to move
from the border to jobs in the interior.
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Inevitably, a number of defendants arrested at the San Clemente
checkpoint and criminally charged with unlawful transportation of
illegal aliens21 challenged the validity of the warrants. On March
5, 1975 a panel of the Ninth Circuit in a split decision held that
a warrant does not transform an otherwise unreasonable seizure
into a constitutional one.22 The court stated:
Although the inspection warrant and its supporting affidavits con-
tain conclusory allegations of probable cause to believe that the
immigration laws are being violated at the San Clemente check-
point, that is not sufficient. These are not "specific and articul-
able facts" which would justify the stopping ....
Search warrants provide no substitute for probable cause.
23
The Government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.
As a result of Martinez-Fuerte, checkpoint operations have been
discontinued in California and Arizona. But in New Mexico and
Texas, which are within the jurisdiction of the Tenth and Fifth
Circuits respectively, checkpoints are being operated without war-
rants. The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Bowman24 held that
the Almeida-Sanchez decision does not challenge the right of immi-
gration officials to make routine inquiries as to an individual's na-
tionality and that a brief stop of an automobile for that purpose
is constitutional. The Fifth Circuit agreed.25
The question of the retroactivity of the Almeida-Sanchez decision
also became the subject of conflicting opinions. The Fifth Circuit
ruled the decision was prospective as to roving patrols. 26 The
Ninth Circuit held the decision was retroactive.27 In United
States v. King2s and United States v. Maddox, 29 the Tenth Circuit
declared that Almeida-Sanchez is retroactive as to checkpoints.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed.30 The Supreme Court resolved the
retroactivity questions in United States v. Peltier8 ' and Bowen v.
21. Immigration and Nationality Act § 274(a) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2)
(1970).
22. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975).
23. Id. at 315.
24. 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973).
25. United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1975).
26. United States v. Miller, 492 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1974).
27. United States v. Peltier, 500 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1974).
28. 485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973).
29. 485 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1973).
30. United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1974).
31. 95 S. Ct. 2313 (1975).
United States.2 By five to four decisions in both cases, the Court
held that the principle of Almeida-Sanchez is not to be applied re-
troactively either in roving patrol or traffic checkpoint searches.
Pointing out that the border patrol had reasonably relied on the
decisions of the courts of appeal in performing the searches, the
Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
would not be served by giving the rule retroactive effect.
"FuNcTIoNAL EQuIVALENI"
Some of the difficulty generated in the wake of Almeida-Sanchez
appears to stem from the two different "functional equivalent" con-
cepts expounded by some of the justices. The majority opinion set
forth a functional equivalent of the border, and the concurring
opinion postulated a functional equivalent of probable cause. Jus-
tice Stewart, acknowledging for the Almeida-Sanchez majority that
the power of the Federal Government to exclude aliens could be
effectuated at the border by routine inspections and searches (i.e.,
without warrant and without probable cause), declared that such
searches may take place not only at the border itself but at its func-
tional equivalent as well.33 He explained:
For example, searches at an established station near the border, at
a point marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend
from the border, might be functional equivalents of border
searches. For another example, a search of the passengers and
cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop
flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent
of a border search. 4
There has never been any question about the two examples given.
At a number of land border locations, persons seeking to enter from
Canada undergo immigration and customs inspection some distance
south of the international boundary: for example, Newport, Ver-
mont-7 miles south of the border; Cannons Coiner, New York-
2.8 miles south of the border; Rouses Point, New York, on Route
9B-1 mile south of the border. With regard to airports, many in
the interior of the country have been officially designated as ports
32. 95 S. Ct. 2569 (1975).
33. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973). The
validity of border searches without probable cause or consent was recog-
nized by the Supreme Court 50 years ago in Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925). In that case, the Court stated:
Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary
because of national self protection reasonably requiring one enter-
ing the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his
belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought. Id. at 154.
34. 413 U.S. at 272-73.
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of entry for arrival of aircraft from foreign countries.35 Border
inspections are also conducted many miles inland at certain seaports
such as Albany, New York and Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 6
To consider the impact of Almeida-Sanchez on more than 20 cases
pending in the Southern District of California, the judges of that
district in a general order directed that a comprehensive factual
hearing be held to evaluate the consequences of that decision on
checkpoints. The cases involving this issue were consolidated and
a comprehensive opinion was prepared by District Judge Turren-
tine.37 Referring to Justice Stewart's phrase, "functional equiva-
lent" as "enigmatic" and labeling it a "slippery concept," Judge Tur-
rentine proceeded to analyze the operation of each traffic check-
point in his district. His purpose was to determine whether any
were located at the functional equivalent of the border. If so, a
warrant for that checkpoint would not be required. Judge Turren-
tine concluded that under Almeida-Sanchez, border searches are
those which take place at the first effective point of entry subject
to the tests of intrusiveness, reasonable relation to the end pursued,
due consideration for geographic characteristics, and available man-
power resources. Measuring each checkpoint against the "border
search" definition of Alneida-Sanchez, he found that all the check-
points in his district are within the constitutionally permissible zone
and are the functional equivalent of the border.
35. See 8 C.F.R. § 100.4(c) (3) (1975).
36. Id.
37. United States v. Baca, 368 F. Supp. 398 (S.D. Cal. 1973). Judge Tur-
rentine made a detailed review of checkpoint operations, describing the im-
portance of their role in the overall law enforcement design for patrol of
the border. He cited the large numbers of illegal aliens and their transpor-
tation by professional smugglers. The illegal alien problem, he noted, is
found primarily in the southwest. Pointing out that in the United States
during fiscal year 1973, approximately 55,300 deportable aliens were appre-
hended by border patrol agents on traffic checking operations, he stated:
While a large number of apprehensions are made at the check-
points each year, as related above, the primary reason for their op-
eration is that they effectively deter large numbers of aliens from
illegally entering the country or violating the terms of any tempo-
rary crossing card they may have, because they form an effective
obstacle and are located on all major routes north out of the border
region.
The deterrence aspect of these traffic checkpoint operations is
amply demonstrated by the fact that the illegal alien has to resort
to the employment of professional smugglers to provide transpor-
tation around or through these checkpoints. Id. at 407.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals entertained a different view.
In Bowen, the court stated that a search is a functional equivalent
of a border search only if it takes place at a location where virtually
everyone searched has just come from the other side of the border,
or if it can be said with reasonable certainty that the vehicle
searched contained either goods which have just been smuggled or
a person who had crossed the border illegally. 8 The Ninth Circuit
has not found that any of the checkpoints in the Southern District
of California are located at the functional equivalent of the border.
In United States v. Lonabaugh,89 where the search took place
at the Brownsville airport, only two miles from the border, the
Fifth Circuit stated:
But the question of what is the functional equivalent of a border
is more complex and will have to be decided on a case by case
basis. Proximity to the border is not the only standard for de-
termining whether a search is the functional equivalent of a search
at the border.
40
The court held that
[t]here must be some substantial connection with the actual or
suspected border crossing by the person or thing to be searched.
In other words, the searching official must know or have a rea-
sonable suspicion that the very individual or thing to be searched
has itself just crossed the border.41
Lonabaugh involved a customs seizure, but was not incident to a
customs inspection.
However, when confronting the immigration checkpoint question
in United States v. Hart,4 2 the Fifth Circuit rejected the idea that
every vehicle must be shown to have probably crossed the border
to be legally stopped at a permanent checkpoint. The court re-
ferred to the "functional equivalent of the border" as a new
aphorism which has arisen from Almeida-Sanchez. Long before
Almeida-Sanchez, the court noted that it had implicitly treated
permanent checkpoints as functional equivalents of the border be-
cause of factors such as proximity to the border, the permanent
nature of the checkpoint, and the hours of operation.48
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Barbera,44 was faced
with a case involving the seizure of an alien's passport after he
38. 500 F.2d at 965-66.
39. 494 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1973).
40. Id. at 1261.
41. Id.
42. 506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1975).
43. Id. at 895.
44. 514 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1975).
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was removed from a bus at a depot ten miles from the Canadian
border because he did not understand English. The seizure was
declared invalid because the depot was not at the functional equiva-
lent of the border and therefore the seizure could not be justified
as a consequence of a border search. The bus had travelled solely
within the United States and the roads leading into the depot did
not have a sufficient nexus with the border.
The concept of "functional equivalent of probable cause" was
postulated by Justice Powell for the issuance of area warrants in
the context of roving patrol searches near the border. He believed
that the housing violations in Camara v. Municipal Court45 were
analogous to the immigration violations in the southwest. Camara
held that general knowledge of housing violations in an area, rather
than in a specific building, met the probable cause requirement for
warrant issuance where there was a long history of judicial and
public acceptance, absence of alternative methods for abating dan-
gerous conditions, and limited invasion of privacy. Having deter-
mined that special conditions near the southwest border provide
an area-wide functional equivalent of probable cause, Justice
Powell set forth the standards that would have to be met for war-
rant issuance under that concept.
40
The Ninth Circuit, in Martinez-Fuerte,47 found that Justice
Powell's administrative inspection analogy in housing violations
was not pertinent to roving patrol searches on highways for illegal
aliens. The court concluded that Justice Powell's premise was un-
satisfactory, and went on to state that even if it agreed with his
premise, it would nevertheless find that the San Clemente check-
point does not meet his standards for issuance of area warrants.
Justice Powell had sketched four standards; frequency with which
illegal aliens are transported within a particular area, proximity
of the area to the border, geographic characteristics, and degree of
interference with rights of innocent travelers, taking into account
the scope of the proposed search and concentrations of illegal alien
traffic in relation to the general traffic.48 The court found that
the frequency with which illegal aliens passed through the check-
45. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
46. Id. at 538.
47. 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975).
48. Id. at 317-18.
point was far too low to make its operation reasonable, and that
San Clemente, which is sixty-five miles from the border, is too far
away, particularly since the checkpoint is on a major interstate
highway between the two largest cities in California.49 The court
also found that the degree of interference with innocent travelers
at the checkpoint was intolerable, as 999 out of every 1000 cars pass-
ing the checkpoint carry only persons who are lawfully within the
country and entitled to use the public highways without interrup-
tion."0
RECENT SUPREmE COURT DECISIONS
On June 30, 1975, the Supreme Court handed down its decisions
on vehicle stops for interrogation by roving patrols"1 and on ve-
hicle searches at traffic checkpoints.52 The opinions of the Court
were delivered by Justice Powell without dissent, but not without
several reluctant concurrences. In Brignoni-Ponce, the Court held
that a roving patrol may not constitutionally stop a vehicle near
the southwest border and question its occupants when the only
ground for suspicion is that they appear to be of Mexican an-
cestry.53 Concluding that random stops, regardless of how modest
the interference is with personal liberty, are unreasonable under
the fourth amendment, the opinion went on to explain the condi-
tions under which a non-border stop of a vehicle may be properly
made without a warrant and without probable cause. The opinion
is instructive and furnishes valuable guidance.
Recognizing the valid public interest in effective measures to con-
trol illegal entry, Justice Powell stated that the interference with
individual liberties which results when an officer stops an automo-
bile and questions its occupants must be weighed against that pub-
lic interest. He noted that roving patrol stops usually consume no
more than a minute and that there is no search of the vehicle and
the occupants. He pointed out that the inspection is limited to
those parts of the vehicle that can be seen by standing alongside
the vehicle and that the occupants are required to respond to only
one or two brief questions and possibly produce a document evi-
dencing their right to be in the United States.54 Drawing on
49. Id. at 321-22.
50. Id. at 322.
51. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S. Ct. 2574 (1975).
52. United States v. Ortiz, 95 S. Ct. 2585 (1975).
53. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2582-83 (1975).
54. Id. at 2579-80.
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Terry v. Ohio55 and Adams v. Williams,56 Justice Powell stated
that in appropriate circumstances, the fourth amendment allows a
properly limited search on facts that do not constitute probable
cause. He observed that in both Terry and Adams, the officers had
acted on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that the suspects were
armed and dangerous, thus justifying a limited search and seizure
as a valid method of protecting the public and preventing crime.
Finding similarly appropriate circumstances with respect to roving
patrol stops, in light of the importance of the governmental interest
at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of
practical alternatives for policing the border, the Court held that
... when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect
that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in
the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the cir-
cumstances that provoke suspicion. 57
Elaborating on the "reasonable suspicion" test, the Court explained
that
... except at the border and its functional equivalents, officers on
roving patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific
articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts,
that reasonably warrant suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens
who may be illegally in the country.58
The Brignoni-Ponce opinion concluded with an extensive list of
factors which may be taken into account in deciding whether there
is reasonable suspicion: (1) characteristics of the area, including
its proximity to the border, the unusual patterns of traffic, and
previous experience with alien traffic; (2) information about recent
illegal border crossings in the area; (3) the driver's behavior, such
as erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade the officer; (4) as-
pects of the vehicle itself, whether it is of a type frequently used for
transporting concealed aliens, is heavily loaded, carries an extra-
55. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry v. Ohio, the Court approved a pat down
for weapons for protection of a police officer investigating suspicious be-
havior of persons he reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous.
56. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). In Adams v. Williams, the Court held that a
policeman was justified in approaching a person to investigate a tip that
he was carrying narcotics and a gun. The tip came from an informant
whose credibility had not been established and whose information was not
shown to be based on personal knowledge.
57. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2580 (1975).
58. Id. at 2582.
ordinary number of passengers, contains persons trying to hide, or
is transporting persons with the characteristic mode of dress or
haircut typical of residents of Mexico. However, it was noted that
each case must turn on the totality of the circumstances.50 In
a significant footnote to Brignoni-Ponce, the Court expressly re-
served the question whether border patrol officers may stop persons
reasonably believed to be aliens when there is no reason to believe
they are illegally in the country.60
In United States v. Ortiz,61 the Supreme Court held that the
differences between a roving patrol and a checkpoint do not justify
dispensing with probable cause to conduct searches at traffic check-
points. The court stated that while the differences would be signifi-
cant in determining the propriety of a stop, they do not appear
to make any difference in the search itself. The decision rejected
the Government's arguments that the location of the checkpoint
limits the officer's discretion in deciding which cars to search and
that the circumstances surrounding checkpoint stops lack the
frightening aspects of roving patrol stops. With respect to these
contentions, the Court noted that only three percent of the cars are
stopped and that the few motorists singled out for search of their
cars may find it offensive.62 Left undecided by Ortiz were a num-
ber of questions. Must checkpoints and roving patrols be con-
sidered the same for all purposes? How far can a checkpoint "in-
spection" go before it constitutes a "search?" Can a warrant be
issued for checkpoint searches based only on information about the
area as a whole?
The Supreme Court also expressly refrained from deciding the
question whether border patrol officers may lawfully stop motorists
for interrogation at an established checkpoint without reason to be-
lieve that a particular vehicle is carrying aliens.08 However, in
the absence of a Supreme Court position on the question, and in
the presence of the Ninth Circuit's decisions that checkpoint stops
require "founded suspicion"64 and that checkpoint warrants are
invalid,65 INS has refrained as of this writing from resuming such
operations in California and Arizona. In New Mexico and Texas,
border patrol officers continue to stop motorists at traffic check-
59. Id.
60. Id. n.9.
61. 95 S. Ct. 2585 (1975).
62. Id. at 2588.
63. Id. at 2589.
64. United States v. Esquer-Rivera, 500 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Juarez-Rodriguez, 498 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1974).
65. United States v. Maxtinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975).
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points but make no vehicle searches unless they have probable
cause. In the meantime, INS is carefully evaluating the impact of
the Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz decisions on its enforcement activi-
ties.66
66. Relevant to the question of conducting any type of legal checkpoint
operations in the Ninth Circuit is that Court's position that vehicle slow
downs are constitutional. In United States v. Evans, 507 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1974) defendant's automobile was waved through a checkpoint because of
its innocent appearance. While the car rolled by without stopping, a border
patrolman saw two persons of Mexican appearance lying on the floor. He
pursued the vehicle, stopped it, and found the illegal aliens. The Ninth
Circuit, holding that the evidence had not been discovered by an unconstitu-
tional stop, rejected the theory that the mere divergence of motor traffic
into a zone where aliens hiding behind the back seat can be observed by
officers violates any constitutionally protected expectations of privacy.
